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2Michael W. Keran*
Economic theory suggests that a change in inflation expectations can
affect velocity by changing the spreadbetween real andnominal interest
rates, and empirical evidence from 1922 to 1983 indicates that major
changes in velocity have been associated with changes in inflation
expectations.
The major policy implication is that when there is a major change in
inflation expectations, the resulting change in the demand for money
shouldbeaccomodatedby the monetaryauthorities to preventdisruption
to the real economy. Such a policy implies targeting real interest rates.
However, asidefrom the rare instances when inflation expectations and
thus velocity changes are large, targeting the nominal money supply is
the superioroperating techniquefor the central bank.
In 1982, the Federal Reserve reduced the impor-
tance it placedon the narrow definition ofmoney-
Ml-as a guide to setting monetary policy because
ofa breakdown in the historic relationship between
M1and nominal GNP. The velocity ofM1had risen
at a relatively stable 3 percent rate from 1952 to
1981, but suddenly, in 1982-83, the velocity of Ml
declined by an unprecedented 5 percent. The only
otheryearsince World War II that velocity declined
was 1954, and that was by a relatively modest Vz
percent. One had to lookback to the 1930s to find a
declinein velocity equalto that in 1982-83.
Any central bank under the same circumstances
faces the major policy question: Does such a large
change in velocity mean that Ml is no longer a
reliable guide to policy?The answerdepends onthe
source of the decline in velocity. If the velocity
decline were a random or unique event in the sense
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that it cannot be explained by standard economic
theory as imbedded, for example, in a demand for
money equation, then a strong case can be made to
abandon MI as a guide to policy at least temporarily.
There are a number of recent economic and
institutional factors leading to such a conclusion:
I. Deregulation-The deregulation of banks,
specifically the permission to pay interest on trans-
actions deposits and on very close substitutes, has
permitted banks to issue deposits thathave transac-
tions characteristics and that are more attractive to
depositors as savings vehicles because· they pay
explicit interest. Deregulation, by changing the rel-
ative attractiveness of various classes of deposits,
could fundamentally change the public'sdemand to
hold Ml. For example, the unprecedented increase
in economic risks and uncertainty associated with
the 1981-82 business cycle contraction could have
induced the public to hold larger precautionary bal-
ances in deregulatedMl than would otherwise have
beenthe case. This would have temporarily reduced
velocity.
402. Financial innovation-When deregulation
does not keep pace with expanding financial oppor-
tunities orthe means to take advantage ofthem, the
financial markets may develop innovations around
regulations. Money market mutual funds are a recent
example ofthis process. Theseaccounts pay market
interest rates and playa limited transactions role.
Their existence could cause the public to hold a
significant part of its transactions deposits outside
the traditionally defined measures ofMl. The stan-
dard arguments explaining demand for MI may no
longer work if there were a significant increase in
the share ofthe transactions balances held in non-MI
form.
In both cases, the net result would be that the
standard demand for money equation, which relates
real money balances to real income and nominal
interest rates, would no longerbe able to explainthe
growth in the public's demand for money. Because
deregulation, financial innovation, and uncertainty
factors may continue to playa significant role in
money demand, one could well expect further shifts
in velocity. Moreover, it would take several years
within a new stable environment before one could
set MI targets that have predictable consequences
for GNP.
An alternative explanationfor the decline in velo-
city in 1982-83 is that it was associated not with a
shift in the demand for money but rather with an
unprecedented change in the factors which deter-
mined the demand for money-a movement along
the demand curve. In this case, we would have
sufficient information to set appropriate targets for
MI because the money demand equation remains
stable. Past articles in this Review have analyzed
the issue andconcluded that the demand for MI was
stableduring the 1982-83 period. According to those
analyses, the major factor operating on velocity in
this episode Was the unusually largedecline in infla-
tion and interest rates. I This decline led to an in-
crease inthedeillarid for money relative to income
and a decline in velocity.
If a decline in velocity can be explained within
the contextofa stable dema.nd for money function,
then the monetary authorities can continue to rely
on MI as a guideto policy. The statistical analysis
supporting this conclusion was based on data from
the mid-l970s to 1982.
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The purpose ofthis article is to extend the earlier
work in both theoretical and empirical domains.
This will be done with a systematic theoretical
analysis ofthe effects ofinterest rates and inflation
expectations on velocity and by incorporating other
episodes where velocity has declined substantially
to see ifthey also can be explained by majordeclines
in inflation and interest rates.
2 Because such
episodes have been so unusual, we must look at a
range ofU.S. economic history thatextends back to
the early 1920s. We will look at velocity equations
using annual data from 1922 to 1983 to discover
whether the most recent experience is consistent
with past relationships.
Some analysts would argue that using data from
the pre-war period is not useful because the institu-
tional factors that determine both GNP and the
money stock have since changed in profound ways:
(1) the government sector makes up a much larger
share of GNP than in the past, and government
regulation affects a significant part of the private
componentofGNP; (2) technological innovation has
greatly reduced the need for holding transactions
balances relative to GNP; and (3) international trade
and capital flows have tied the U.S. economy more
closely to the rest ofthe world.
These andotherconsiderationscouldhave funda-
mentally altered the velocity relationship overtime.
In these circumstances, velocity would not neces-
sarily respond to the same set offactors in the two
periods. These considerations imply that using pre-
war data on velocity to help explain the post-war
movements in velocity may be a futile exercise.
However, if the evidence supports the proposition
that velocity in both periods can be explained by the
same set offactors, we can reasonably infer that-
given all of the apparent differences between the
two periods-the differences are not sufficient to
have a major effect on the public's demand for
money and/or velocity. The results reported below
support the proposition that the 1982-83 decline in
velocity can be explained by the same factors that
have determined velocity since 1922. We conclude,
therefore, that MI canbe used as a reliable guide to
policy in the future.
In Section I, we layout the theoretical underpin-
nings ofthe casual discussion above. In Section II,
we present the empirical relationships, and, in Sec-
tion III, the policy conclusions and summary.I. Theoretical Considerations
The economic behavior by households and busi-
nesses that lies behind the money/income relation
we summarize with the term velocity can be
analyzed within a Keynesian theoretical framework.
This framework defines the conditions that deter-
mine the equilibrium supply and demand for money
(the LM curve) and the equilibrium conditions that
determine the demand for goods orreal GNP (the IS
curve). These relations are summarized in Figure
l.
Assuming that the supply ofmoney is determined
by the monetary authorities, the LM curve defines
the public's real or price-adjusted demand for
money. This real money demand is influenced by
two factors-real GNP and nominal interest rates.
As GNP increases, the public's demand for money
increases to meet its greater transaction needs. As
nominal interest rates rise, the public reduces its
demand for money because the "opportunity cost"
of holding money has increased. The slope of the
LM curve represents that combination of higher
GNP and higher interest rates that will hold the
demand for money equal to a constant supply of
money as determined by the central bank.
The IS curve (Investments/Savings) illustrates
that combination ofreal interest rates and real GNP
that will equate "savings" and "investment".










mined independently of GNP. Investment will
increase with lowerreal interest rates (the real inter-
est rate is the nominal interest rate less the expected
rate of inflation) because the profitability of an
investment depends on whether the internal rate of
return on that investment is sufficiently high to pay
the interestcost. The lower the real interest rate, the
larger the number of investment projects that will
have an internal rate of return high enough to be
profitable. Savings (and tax receipts), in contrast,
are primarily a function of GNP. High levels of
GNP lead to high levels ofsavings and tax receipts.
Historically, savings have been found to represent a
rather stable share of GNP over long periods of
time, irrespective of the level of real or nominal
interest rates.
The equilibrium conditions for the demand for
real GNP (omitting international considerations)
require that investment (plus government spending)
equals savings (plus tax receipts). The slope ofthe
IS curve shows that the equality of savings and
investment is achieved when real interest rates fall
and real GNP rises. A fall in real interest rates
increases investment while a rise in real GNP will
increase savings.
In Figure I, the velocity ofmoney is the ratio of
real GNP measured on the horizontal axis to the
fixed quantity of real money implied in the LM
curve. Any movement along the LM curve would
imply a change in velocity witha stable demand for
money. When inflation expectations are positive
(pe), they will drive a wedge betweenthe LM and IS
curves. At the same level ofrealGNP(pointA), the
nominal interest rate that will equate the supply and
demand for money will be at Rl. The real interest
rate that equates savings and investment will be at
R*I. The difference is equal to the expected rate of
inflation (pe). A fall in the expected inflation rate
will reduce the wedge between the LM and IS
curves and thereby reduce GNPand velocity. A rise
in the expected inflation rate will increase the.wedge
between the LM and IS curves, and raise GNP and
velocity. The latter results because in each example
the real money stock is being held constant and real
GNP is changing.Comparative Statics
The effect ofnominal interest rates and inflation
expectations on velocity is illustrated in a different
way in Figure 2. In the long-run, real GNPwill be at
a level consistentwithequilibrium utilizationofour
capital and labor resources. This can be referred to
as full employment. Assuming such a level ofGNP
is represented by YF, there can be a wide range of
realdemands for money, andthus, levels ofvelocity,
depending upon the level ofinflation expectations.
If inflation expectations were high (equal to pel,
nominal interest rates would be high, the demand
for and supply ofmoney would be relatively low (as
represented by LM'), and velocity wouldbe high. If
inflation expectations were zero, nominal interest
rates would be low (equal to'real interest rates) and
the demand for and supply of money would be
higher (LM") with a corresponding lower level of
velocity. Thus, in the long-run, a fall in inflation
expectations will lead to a fall in nominal interest
rates, a rise in the demand for real money, and a
once and for all decline in velocity.
In eachofthe steady stateconditionsdescribed in
Figure 2, real interest rates and real GNP are at the
same unchanged levels determined by the relative
endowments of capital, labor and technology. The
only differences between these steady states are the
levels ofinflation expectations and nominal interest
rates that change the real demand for money and
velocity.
Figure 2
In principle, other factors could affect velocity
besides inflation expectations. For example, an
increase in the internal rate of return on capital
could increase the steady state level of real GNP
(that is, shift the IS curve to the right) and lead to a
parallel rise in real and nominal interest rates, a
lower demand for money, and a higher level of
velocity.4 Alternatively, a permanent easing offiscal
policy through structural budget deficits could lead
to a parallel rise in real and nominal interest rates
and, throughthe same process described above, to a
rise in the level ofvelocity. 5
The Transition Period
The transition from one inflation expectation
environment to another would depend upon the
monetarycontrol rule followed by the central bank.
Three such monetarycontrol rules canbe identified:
(I) targeting real interest rates, (2) targeting the
nominal money stock, and (3) targeting the nominal
interest rate. The implication ofeachofthese control
rules is illustrated in Figure 3 under the assumption
ofa majordecline in inflation expectations.
With a real interest rate target (Alternative I), the
decline in inflationexpectations would require afull
parallel decline in nominal interest rates. The central
bank could achieve this by permitting the nominal
money stock to increase, thereby shifting the LM
curve to the right (LM I). Under this monetary










(3) (2) (1 ) GNP*and interest rates would be the same as the long-run
results (described in Figure 2). That is, the full
employment level of real income would remain
unchanged at Point I, and the increase in the desire
to hold real money stock would be satisfied by an
increase in the nominal money supply.
Under Alternative 2, keeping the nominal money
stock unchanged, the LM curve would be unchanged
at LM 2 in Figure 3 in the short-run. Nominal
interest rates would fall by some fraction of the
decline in inflation expectations and real interest
rates would rise so that, in the short-run, real GNP
would fall to point 2, below the full employment
level of GNP. Over the longer run, however, the
higher real interest rates and lower real GNP will
cause the price level to fall. Under anominal money
supply target, this would lead to a rise in real money
supply and a rightward shift in the LM curve. The
rise in real money balances would continue until
suchtime as prices stopped falling and stabilizedat a
new, lower level. This would occur when real GNP
had increased to its full employment level(Point I)
in Figure 3. Thus, the long-run results ofAlternative
2 (targeting nominal money supply) would be the
same as the long-run results of Alternative I with
respect to real income. The difference would bethat
the price level would be lower under Alternative 2.
Furthermore, in the short-run or transition period,
real interest rates would be higher and real GNP
would be lower unde.r Alternative 2.
Under a nominal interest rate target (Alternative
3), a decline in inflation expectations would cause
the central bank to reduce the nominal money supply
in the short-run to LM 3. This would force real
interest rates to rise by an amount equal to the fall in
inflation expectations, reducing real GNPto Point 3.
Overthe longer run, the higherreal interestrate and
lower real GNP will cause the price level to fall.
While this would, ceteris paribus, raise the real
money stock as in Alternative 2, the central bank
could offset the rise by further reducing the nominal
money supply to keep nominal interestfrom falling.
Furthermore, with expectations of price deflation,
the real interest rate would rise above the nominal
interest rate, inducing further declines in real GNP
and prices. Each fall in prices would contribute to
maintaining "deflation" expectations and real
interest rates above the nominal rate. There would
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be no theoretical limit to the size ofthe fall in prices
and real GNP would be "permanently" below its
full employment level under this nominal interest
rate rule.
What the preceding discussion shows is that afall
in inflation expectations will by itself tend to raise
real interest rates and lower real GNP. This process
can only be offset by a decline in nominal interest
rates in the full amount of the decline in inflation
expectations. The central bank can achieve this
result only by allowing the money supply to increase
in line with the fall in nominal interest rates. Ifthe
central bank does not allow this monetary accom-
modation, one of two results will occur. Under a
money supply rule (Alternative 2), the effect in the
short-run would be higher real interest rates and
lower real GNP; in the long-run, it would be a low
price level. Under Alternative 3 (nominal interest
rate target), the price level would decline without
limit and real GNP will be permanently less than its
level at full employment.
Interpreting the Model
The equation used to estimate the effects ofinfla-
tion expectations and nominal interest rates on
velocity, as formally derived in the appendix, has
the following form:
~ In (V) = all + a l ~ In (R) + a2 ~ (1')C)
The change in velocity is a function of both the
change in the nominal interest rate and the change in
inflation expectations.
6 The coefficienton the inter-
est rate variable (a l ) measures the partial effect ofa
change in nominal interest rates onvelocity holding
inflation expectations unchanged. This is the case
where real and nominal interest rates change to-
gether. A change in nominal interest rates affects
velocity directly through achange in the demand for
money, whereas achange in real interest rates affects
velocity indirectly through its effects on real GNP.
These two forces tend to have opposite effects on
velocity. For example, a rise in nominal interest
rates will reduce the demand for money and raise
velocity. In contrast, a rise in real interest rates will
reduce real GNP and reduce velocity. The strength
ofthis last effectdepends on the income elasticity in
the demand for money. Ifthat elasticity were I, then
changes in GNP would leadto proportional changes
in the demand for money and no effect on velocity.However, if, as most statistical estimates suggest,
the income elasticity is somewhat less than I, a
decline in GNP will lead to a proportionally smaller
decline in the demand for money and, therefore, a
fall in velocity. Thus, the aj coefficient wouldbe the
sum of the positive value coming from the LM
curve ofa change in nominal interest rates and the
negative value coming from the IS curve ofaparallel
change in real interest rates.
The coefficient on inflation expectations (a2)
measures the partial effect of a change in inflation
expectations holding nominal interest rates un-
changed. As such, this influence works only through
the goods market and GNP and has an unambig-
uously positive sign. Forexample, a rise in inflation
expectations will lead to a fall in real interest rates
and therefore a rise in real GNP. Because the income
elasticity of the demand for money is less than
unity, the rise in GNP will raise velocity.
A parallel change in nominal interest rates and
inflation expectations would be measured by both
the at and a2 coefficients. They would represent the
effects on velocity coming from the LM curve with-
out any velocity effects coming from the IS curve
because real interest rates and, thus, real income,
would be unchanged.
This discussion suggests that if the Federal Re-
serve followed a real interest rate policy that allowed
all changes in inflation expectations to show up as
changes in nominal interest rates, the policy-induced
change in velocity would be measured by both of
the coefficients at plus a2 • However, ifthe Federal
Reserve followed a nominal interest rate policy-
that is, allowing changes in inflationexpectations to
affect only the real rates, then the policy-induced
effects on velocity would be measured only by the
a2 coefficient. If the Federal Reserve followed a
money supply rule, the policy-induced effects on
velocity would fall somewhere between the two
interest rate rules because both real and nominal
rates would change.
Policy Implications
One should not infer from this analysis that tar-
geting real interest rates is always a superior mone-
tary policy instrument. There are two reasons for
skepticism. First, the real interest rate is not a
measurable series, while nominal interest rates and
money are measurable to a reasonable degree of
accuracy.7 It is possible, therefore, to make a mis-
take in attempting to apply areal interest rate target.
Second, as demonstrated in the empirical section to
follow, the interest rate effect on velocity is rather
small and major changes in inflation expectations
are needed to produce the analytical results discussed
above. Such large changes in inflation expectations
are a relatively rare phenomena and therefore should
not be used routinely for setting monetary policy
targets. Money is clearly superior to nominal interest
rates as a guide to controlling generally GNP and,
under most normal circumstances, is generally
superior to real interest rates because of measure-
ment problems with the latter.
II. Empirical Relations
Overview
Over the broad sweep of U.S. economic history,
there has been a close link between changes in MI
and changes in nominal GNP. Chart I shows annual
rates ofchange in MI and nominal GNP from 1922
to 1983. Except for World War II and its immediate
aftermath (shown as a shaded area), the year-by-year
changes in nominal GNPare rather closely matched
by changes in MI. In the pre-war period of the
1930s, the major decline in income was associated
with a major decline in Ml. The rapid growth in
income in the mid-1930s and the 1937-38 recession
were also associated with the rise and fal! in MI. 8 In
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tr?Post-WorldWar II years from 1952 to 1981,
there was a long period of relatively stable and
predictable increases in income associated with
increases in MI. On average, GNP grew 3 percent
faster than MI, from 1952 to 1981, with a standard
deviation ofabout 1.8 percent. This contrasts with a
standard deviation for the money/GNP relationship
over the entire 1922-1983 period (omitting World
War II) of4.5 percent.
The apparent break in the money/GNPrelation in
1982-83, while it was out of line with the previous
30 years, was a relatively modest change whenviewed over the past 60 years. It is interesting to
note that GNP tended to reinforce and not offsetthe
movements in M1. That is, a decline in MI would
lead to a more than proportional decline in GNP,
such as in the early 1930s. The one year when the
decline in velocity was offset by a rise in MI was
1983 (more on this later).
These large shifts in the money/GNPrelationship
are, ofcourse, ret1ected in the movements in velo-
city. The pattern of velocity, with its· associated
movements in interest rates, is shown in Chart 2
(World War II and its immediateaftermathareomit~
ted from Charts 2-4.). In the pre-war period ofthe
1920s, both velocity and interest rates were first
relatively t1at; they declined substantially in the
early 1930s and remained at a historically low level
through World War II, until the Fed-U.S. Treasury
accord in 1951.
9 In the post-war period after 1952,
velocity tended to rise steadily with the rise in
interest rates. As economic theory would suggest,
much of the movement in velocity in the United
States in the last 60 years can be explained by the
movement in nominal interest rates.
Chart 3 shows the same relation betweennominal
interest rates and velocity in year-over-yearchanges
in log form (omitting 1941-5/). This way ofpresen-
ting the data brings out clearly the close association
between nominal interest rates and velocity. During
the pre-war period (1922-40), there were much
larger variations in both interest rates and velocity
than in the post-war period (1952-83). Thus, the
decline in velocity in 1982-83, while it was by far
the largest in the post-war period, was relatively
small compared to, for example, 1930-33 or 1938-39.
The unusual stability in the growthofvelocity in the
last thirty-plus years is at least partially due to the
relatively smallervariations in interestrates. Never-
theless, during the 1970s, the stability of velocity
was greater than that which would be explained
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46For example, the decline in interest rates in
1971~72 and 1975-76did not appearto affect velocity
significantly. This contrasts sharply with the re-
sponseofvelocity in other periods (including
1982-83) to a decline in interest rates. Soine special
factors mightexplain the.lack of response in the
1970s. Wage andpricecontrols, imposed in August
1971, could haveaffectedinterestrates butnot velo-
city. Again in 1975-76, there waS a well-documented
and statistically significant downward shift in the
demandfor M I that would have offsetthe effectofa
deCline in interestrates on velocity. I() Theseepisodes
could have masked the underlying relationship
between interest rates and velocity. We will consider
that issue further in the formalstatistical section of
this paper.
The relation between inflation and interest rates
is shown in Chart 4 for the period from 1922 to
1983. In the post-WorldWarIIera, from 1952-1981,
the gradual rise in interest rates was matched by a
parallel rise in the inflationrate. Furthermore, many
of theyear~to~yearchanges in interest rates were
associated with parallel changes in the inflation
rate. During the 1950s and1960s,when the inflation
rate was relatively low, the interest rate averaged
one to two percent above the inflation rate. During
the 1970s,. when·the inflation rate was relatively
high, the interest rate averaged between zero and
one percent below the inflation rate. Starting in
1980, the interest rate has moved sharply above the
inflationrate, decliniI1g in 1982-83 only with a drop
in theil1flation rate.
The link between interest rates and inflation rates
beforeWorldWarII (1922~40)wasnot as closeas in
the post-warperiod. However, the changes in infla-
tionand interest rates were similar. For example,
the major decline in interest rates in 1929~33 was
associated with a major fall in inflation (actually
deflation). The decline in nominal interest rates,

























2.0prices fell an average of seven percent per year for
four years while the nominal interest rate couldnot
fall below zero. As a result, the real interestrate
during the Great Depression reached its highest
level ofany time in the sixty years covered by this
study.
This example illustrates one ofthe major points
brought out in the theoretical discussion in Section
I. In an episode ofmajor decline in inflationexpec-
tations, targeting nominal interest rates destabilizes
the economy. During the 1930-33 period, the mone-
tary authorities defined policy in terms ofthe level
of nominal interest rates. There is ample evidence
that they thought they were following an easy mon-
etary policy during this period because nominal
interest rates fell to new historic lows. 11 Instead,
this nominal interest rate policy in the.face of a
major decline in inflation expectations led to a sub-
stantial rise in real interest rates. Itis also clearthat
the monetary authorities did not follow a money
supply target, because Ml declined by over 30
percent in those four years. Only when this nominal
interest rate policy was abandoned in 1934 did output
and prices start to recover. That was done indirectly
by raising the price of gold from $20 to $35 an
ounce, making it attractive for foreigners to sell
gold to the United States. According to the then-
established rules of central banking, the Federal
Reserve monetized the gold inflow, and thereby
increased the liquidity of the banking system and
the money supply. 12
This nominal interest rate targeting episode can
be contrasted with the monetary authorities' re-
sponse to the decline in inflation expectations in
1982-83. In this later case, it could be argued that
the Fed followed a de facto real interest rate target.
That is, nominal interest rates were allowed to fall
in line with the decline in inflation. This could only
be accomplished by allowing the nominal money
stock to rise substantially to satisfy the increased
desire to hold real money balances at lower nominal
interest rates. As a result, real interest rates were
kept from rising and real GNP increased substan-
tially in 1983. This is the only episode in the sixty
Chart 3
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61 65 69 73 77 81yearscoveredby the study when adecline in velocity
was matched by an increase in the money supply
which neutralized the effect on real interest rates
and real GNP ofa decline in inflation expectations.
StatisticaiAnalysis
In Section I and more formally in the appendix,
we show thatboth the nominal interest rate (R) and
inflation expectations (pe) wouldhave an important
influence on velocity. 13 In this section, we will test
those propositions with formal statistical procedures
usingannualdatafrom 1922to1983 (omitting 1941-
51)..The interest rate is for short-termU.S. Treasury
securities (after 1952, the three-monthTreasury Bill
rate).14 Illfla.tionexpectations are approximated by
the actual inflation rate as represented by the GNP
price deflator. This is a commonmeasure ofinflation
expectations especially in association with short-
term interest rates. Velocity is measured as the ratio
ofreal GNP to real MI (currency andall transactions
deposits in the hands ofthe non-bank public). The
results ofestimating an equation in first difference
oflogs with a lagged dependentvariable, to measure
lagged adjustment,is givenbelow (tstatistics are in
brackets below the estimated coefficients).
Ll In (V) = .0098 + .039 Ll In (R)
(2.4) (4.4)






Over the period since 1922, changes in velocity
have been significantly correlated with changes in
nominal interest rates and inflation. Based on the
value and statistical significance ofthe lagdependent
variable Ll In (V)_I' 70 percentofthe adjustment of
velocity to interest rates and inflation occurs in the
Chart 4
Interest Rate and Inflation
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61 65 69 73 77 81 85first year. It takes a relatively large movement in
interest rates to affect velocity. For exatllple, a 10
percent change in nominal interest rates, say, from
10 percentto 11 percent(holding inflationconstant),
would leadto a first yearchange in velocity ofabout
.4 percent. Alternatively, a I percentage point
change in inflation from 10 percent to 11 percent
(holding nominal interestrates constant) would lead
to a first yearchange in velocity ofabout.7 percent.
We can therefore infer that a parallel change in
nominal interest rates and inflation from 10 percent
to 11 percent would mean a first year change in
velocity of about 1.1 percent. (In the general case,
these coefficients are not strictly additive because
the percent change in interest rates depends on the
base levels.)
These empirical results confirm the earlier theo-
retical discussion that showed that parallel changes
in nominal and real interest rates would have a
smaller effect on velocity (.4 percent) than parallel
changes in nominal interest rates and inflation ex-
pectations (1.1 percent). The reason for this result is
that real interest rates have an opposite effect on
velocity than nominal interest rates, as long as the
income elasticity in the demand for money is less
than one. IS
The estimated and actual values of changes in
velocity in 1982-83 are given below in Table 1.
They show that the equation was successful in pre-
dicting a decline in velocity in those two years,
although it missed the size ofthe decline by a fairly
substantial amount. 16
Table 1
Percent Change in Velocity
Actual Estimate Error
1982 -2.4 -1.2 .2
1983 -3.0 -1.7 1.3
Furthermore, the equation also forecast a decline
in velocity in 1976 when velocity actually rose 4.9
percent, one of the largest increases on record, In
addition, the equation forecast an unchangedvelo-
city in 1971, when actual velocity rose by 1.6 percent.
These errors can, ofcourse, beexplained, by special
factors, as mentioned above. In 1971, pricecontrols
were imposed on the U.S. economy. And, in 1976,
a historically large and empirically significant shift
50
in the demand for money tookplace. Adding dummy
variables for these two episodes greatly improves
the statistical fit ofthe equation andalso reduces the
error for forecasting the velocity in 1982-83.
However, such adjustments raise important meth-
odological issues in economic theory that call their
usefulness into question.
If in fact a series of events that temporarily
loosened the relation between velocity on the one
hand and interest rates and inflation on the other
buffeted the 1970s, there is a simple technique for
dealing with the problem if we believe the problem
is now over. We can estimate the equation through
1970 and then forecast velocity on the basis ofthose
estimates in the 1980s. We followed this procedure
and give the estimate of velocity in the period
1922-1970 (again omitting 1941-51) below.
Ll In (V) = .0076 + .041 Llln (R)
(1.6) (4.2)






The results are very close to the estimate for the
whole period, except that the trend in velocity (the
constant term) is slightly lower and the coefficient
values on interest rates and inflation are slightly
higher. This equation is used to produce dynamic
simulations ofvelocity from 1980-83. The results in
both level and percent change form are given below
in Table 2.
Starting with the actual value ofvelocity in 1979,
the equationsimulates the rise through 1981, and the
fall of velocity in 1982-83. The simulated level of
velocity is only two-tenths of a percent different
from actual velocity in 1983, because, as shown in
the percent change column, the errors in simulating
velocity on a year-by-yearbasis tendedtooffsetone
another. The largest forecast error, interestingly
enough, was in 1981 when the actual velocity in-
creased 4.8 percent and the simulated value in-
creased only 2.6 percent. This underforecast was
offset by modest overforecast of velocity in 1980,






















Level Change Level Change
6.59 3.0 0.5 0.7
6.76 2.6 1.5 -2.2
6.62 -2.1 -1.1 0.1
6.49 -2.0 -0.2 1.0
Policy Implications
The theoretical analysis and empirical evidence
considered in this article lead to the conclusion that
when there is a major change in inflation expecta-
tions, it is better to target real interest rates than to
target nominal interest rates or even the nominal
money stock. The analysis, however, also indicates
that under most circumstances, thepreferredmone-
tary targetofthe centralbankshould be.the nominal
money stock. There are two reasons for this prefer-
ence. First, the money stock can be measureddirect-
ly, while real interest rates can be measured only
indirectly with the possibility of a large measure-
mertt error. Second, the large changes in inflation
expectations neededto have a largeeffecton velocity
occur rarely. Thus, the need for a monetary target
focusing on realinterest rates also would be rare.
This point is illustrated in Chart 1, which shows
that there has been a close historic relation between
money and GNP over the 1922-83 period. Devia-
tions in this relation have occurred only in periods
when very large parallel changes in interest rates
and inflation led to substantial changes in the pub-
lic's desire to hold money relative to income. This
impres:-;nn isconfirmedwhen annualchanges in the
real GNP are compared to annual changes in real
MI and interest rates from 1922 to 1983.
17
Llln (GNP*) = .019 + .86 Llln (Ml*)
(3.3) (7.0)






For every one percent increase in real Ml, real
GNP will increase by .86 percent. For every one
percent increase in nominal interest rates, real GNP
will increase by .05 percent. Bothofthese influences
on GNP are significant statistically. However, the
magnitude of the Ml influence is almost twenty
times greater than the magnitude of the nominal
interest rate influence. We surmise that it takes very
large changes in nominal interest rates to cause
GNP to move in ways other than that associated
with changes in MI. 18
III. Summary and Conclusions
Most of the literature in monetary economics
describes the link between changes in money on the
one hand and changes in GNP and inflation on the
other hand. The purpose of this article is to show
that when there are large changes in inflation expec-
tations, there can be a large change in velocity. The
reason forthis reverse linkbetween inflationand the
GNP/money relation is based on the fact that the
demand for money depends on the nominal interest
51
rate while the demand for GNP depends upon the
real interest rate. Thus, changes in inflation expec-
tations will change the spread between nominal and
real interest rates in such a way as to have opposite
effects upon the demand for money and GNP. For
example, a fall in inflation expectations will simul-
taneously lead to a fall in nominal interest rates
and/or a rise in real interest rates such that the
demand for money goes up and real GNP goesdown. Bothforces wouldoperateto lowervelocity.
This article shows that the link between inflation
expectations and nominal interest rates to velocity is
statistically significant However, because major
changes in inflation expectations are rare, major
changes in velocity also arerare. Forexample, there
has been only one major decline inyelocity since
World War II.
The implications of these results for monetary
policy are as follows. Undermostcircumstancesthe
Federal Reserve policy oftargeting MIwill result in
reasonably accurate control ofthe GNP in the short-
run and inflation in the longer run. However, in
those episodes when there has been a major change
in inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve would
have a strong case for''targeting" real interestrates
rather than MI. Because of problems measuring
real rates, such a targeting procedure would neces-
sarily be crude. Nevertheless, developments in
1982-83 that allowed the nominal interest rate to fall
in line with the fall in actual inflation were reason-
able. In such circumstances, the Federal Reserve
would allow money supply growth to accommodate
whatever changes in the demand for money came
from the such a change in nominal interest rates.
Ifa nominal interest rate is targeted when there is
a major decline in inflation expectations, the resul-
ting rise in real interest rates would choke off the
growth ofreal GNP. The fundamental fact is thatthe
decline in inflation will increase the desire of the
public to hold money. Ifthis is not satisfied by the
52
central bank's increase in the supply ofmoney, then
it will be satisfied by the public through a rise in real
interest rates and a fall in GNP. That is precisely
how the public achieved its desired increase in
money balances during the great deflation of the
early 1930s.
Itcan be argued thatthe FederalReserve action in
October 1982 to reduce the role ofMl as a guide to
policy was consistent with a movement to a real
interest rate target during a periodofdeclining infla-
tion expectations. The decline in actual inflation by
that date was sufficiently large to make itclearthata
substantial decline in at least short-run inflation
expectations was occuring. As shown in Chart 4,
short-term nominal interest rates were allowed to
fall by the full amount of the decline in inflation,
and MI was allowed to rise substantially above its
long-run target range. According to the analysis of
this article, that is the appropriate response of a
central bank to a major decline in inflation.
If the decline in inflation expectations is now
over, the decline in velocity should also be over.
The resumption of normal growth in velocity can
already be seen in the quarterly GNP and money
data. From the first quarter of 1983 to the second
quarter of 1984 (latest data available), the velocity
ofMI has increased 3.4 percent. This is somewhat
higher than the trend growth in velocity for the
thirty years from 1951 to 1981, and about equal to
the growth in velocity in a typical business cycle
expansion.Theoretical Appendix
1. Money Market Equilibrium
LM: In (M*) =a, In (GNP*) - a2 (R)
2..GoodsMarketEquilibrium
In (GNP*) - f31 (R*) + f32 (Z)
Z is all variables which affectGNP, other than the real interest rate (R*).
3. FisherEquation
R = pc + R*
Solvefor Velocity
4. In (V) = In (GNP*) In (M*)
Use (I) to substitute into4 to eliminate M*.
5. In (V) = (l ~ a,)In(GNP*)+ a2(R)
Use (2) to substitute into 5 toeliminate GNP*.
In (V) (l __a,)(-,s, R* + f32 Z)+ a2 (R)
In (V)= ~ (I~al) f3,R* + (I-a,) f32 Z + a2 (R)
Use(3) to substitute into (6) toeliminate R*.
In (V) = - (I-al ) f31 (R--pe) + (I~a,) f32 Z + a2 (R)
= ~ (I---aJ f3, R + (I-a,) f31 pe + (I-a,) f32 Z + a2 R
Combining coefficients on R yields the following Estimating Equation
Estimating Equation















1. See M.W. Keran, "Velocity and Monetary Policy in 1982",
Weekly Leiter, March 18, 1983; J. Judd, "TheRecent Decline
in Velocity: Instability in Money Demand or Inflation?",
Economic Review, Spring, 1983;J. Judd and R. McElhattan,
"The Behavior of Money and the Economy, 1982-83", Eco-
nomic Review, Summer 1983, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco.
2. Factors other than change in inflation expectations can
also have permanent (that is, non-business cycle) effects
on velocity. In principle, any factor that can have a perma-
nent effect on nominal interest rates, and therefore money
demand, without a permanent effect on GNP will affect
velocity. It is the contention of this paper that historically
only changes in inflation expectations have had such an
impact. This issue is further discussed in thetheory section
ofthis paper.
3. In this discussion we will invokethestandard Keynesian
assumption of an unchanging price level. However, we will
allow for changes in inflation expectations. This seeming
anomaly can be explained along the following lines. The
assumption ofan unchanged price level describestheprice
level "today", while changes in inflation expectations
describe what people expect to happen to prices "tomor-
row". This assumption greatly simplifies the exposition
without doing violence to reality in the short-run analysis.
This price level assumption is then relaxed to analyze the
longerrun implicationsofthe model.
4. Therise in velocitywould occurfrom twosources: (1) the
rise in nominal interest rates would reduce the real money
demand for any level of real GNP, (2) the rise in real GNP
could lead to a less than proportional increase in money
demand.
5. The emergence of structural budget deficits as a result
of the tax and spending decisions made by the Reagan
Administration in mid-1981 have probably raised real and
nominal interest rates. To theextentthatthetax cuts stimu-
lated permanent increases in the level of capital, labor and
technology, they would be associated with permanently
higherreal GNP, higherreal and nominal interestrates,and
a higher levelofvelocity. To the extentthatthetax cutsonly
encouraged consumption, and not investment, they would
leave the steady state level of real GNP unchanged (or
perhaps lower), and lead to a rise in real interest rates
without a depressing effect on business cycle real GNP
because of the offsetting stimulus of the deficit. In either
case, it is likely thatthe above-trend rise in velocity in 1981
was dueto the parallel rise in real and nominal interest rates
associated with the emergence of structural deficits. It is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this
issue in detail.
6.. Two elaborating points can be made about this equation.
1) In the theoretical appendix, the estimating equation is
derived from a structural model in which interest rates are
presented in percentageform. In the actual estimation ofthe
equation, however, the interest rate is presented in natural
log form. The results are SUbstantially the same either way,
exceptfor the period 1934-40when the level ofinterest rates
was very low. The interest rate in natural log form has more
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variation in this period and, by the same token, better tracks
the change in velocity. 2) From a statistical perspective, ifthe
movement in nominal interest rates was in lock step with
inflation expectations at all times, that is, real interest rates
were constant, then itwould be impossibleto estimate statis-
tically the partial effects of both variables on velocity. How-
ever, as can be seen in Chart 4 and as confirmed in the
statistical analysis, there is sufficient variance in these two
series to estimate statistically significant partial effects on
velocity.
7. M1 is not as easy to measure as nominal interest rates
because: (1) M1 is subject to revisions after the fact when
more complete data is available on transactions deposits
and currency holdings. These"benchmark" revisions ofM1
have been substantial in the past when a large body of
deposit creating institutions did not report regularly to the
Federal Reserve. This problem, however, hasbeen largely
solved since the Monetary Control Act of 1980 mandated
frequent reporting ofdata by all deposit creating institutions.
(2) M1 is subject to major monthly and quarterly swings for
seasonal reasons. These seasonal changes in M1 demand
(for example, increased demand during the Christmas
season) will notaffect future GNP and mustbedistinguished
from changes in M1 supply induced by central bank action,
which will have an effect on future GNP. Seasonal adjust-
ment techniques have been developed to deal with this
issue, but there can be substantial revisions in the season-
ally adjusted data-as much as one year after the fact-
which can reduce the role of M1 as a guide to policy. It is
important to recognize that this problem applies only to
monetary policy within a year, because the seasonal ad-
justment by definition is washed out over the year. Even
within a year, the quantitative importance of seasonal revi-
sions has been relatively minor. The largestsix-month revi-
sion in recent history was 1 percent in the second half of
1983. This revision is well within the standard error of the
moneyIGNP link of approximately 21/2 percent.
8. See Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, Monetary
Historyofthe UnitedStates (1963), fora detaileddiscussion
ofthis period. Theirworkprovides convincing evidence that
the line of causation runs from central bank actions to the
moneysupplyto income.
In World War II andthe immediate post-warperiod (1941-
1951), there was a weakerassociation between money and
income than during either the interwar period or the post-
war period. The reason wasthat price controls understated
the rate of growth of nominal income relative to money
during the war and overstated it after the war when the
controls were removed.
9. During World War II and continuing until 1951,the Federal
Reserve kept U.S. interest rates at very low levels to mini-
mizethecostoffinancingtherapidincreasesin thenational
debt. The accord freed the Federal Reserve from this inter-
est rate pegging fUnction.
10. See Judd and Scadding, "The Search for a Stable
Money Demand Function: A Surveyofthe Post-1973 liter-
ature", Review of Economic Uterature, December 1982.
They concludethat an analysisofall theempiricalevidenceon the 19.75-.76 period supports the propositionthaUhere
was a statistically significant decline in the demandfor Mi.
11. The Board Of Govern()rs described its policy fOr the
year1930 as oneof"monetaryease...(With) theprogressive
reductio~s in Reserve Bankdiscount and acceptance rates."
SeeFriedman andSchwartz,MonetaryHistoryoftheljnited
States, p. 3.74"3.75. The dominant view within the Federal
Reserve System .isreflected in the followirg qu()tes based
on the exchange of letters among Federal Reserve Gover-
nors, July 1930. John Calkins of San FranciSCo stated that
"with credit cheap and redundant, we do not believe that
business recovery will be accelerated by making credit
cheaper and more redundant." George W. Norris of Phila-
delphia stated his view, "ofthe fruitlessness and unwisdom
of attempting to depress still further the abnormally low
interest rates now prevailing." Ibid., p. 3.72. One exception
to this easy monetary policy during the early 1930s was in
September 1931, when the Federal Reserve raised the
discount rate by the then-unprecedented amount of one
percentage point in response to Great Britain leaving the
gold standard.
12. See. M.W. Keran, "An Evaluation of Federal Reserve
Actions 1933-68," in Federal Reserve Bank of S1. Louis'
Review, July 1969.
13. The same set of economic assumptions discussed in
Section II also showthatthe elementsthatmakeupvelocity
(GNP and M1) can have an important effect on nominal
interest rates and inflation expectations. This creates what
statisticians call a simultaneous.equation problem, that is,
the association can go from interest rates and inflation to
velocity orfrom velocityto interest rates and inflation. Ifthe
direction of causation cannot be identified, then we have a
problem. At best, the coefficients would be biased, and at
worst, we may be estimating a reverse causation from
velocity to interest rates and inflation. The simUltaneous
equation problem is dealtwith as follows in this article. With
respectto inflation, the link between money and income on
the one hand and inflation on the other is sufficiently long
that the current values of inflation can be considered inde-
pendent of the current values of velocity. Thus, from a
statistical.point of view, we can assume that changes in
inflation are notcaused bycurrentchanges in velocity. With
respect to nominal interest rates, two factors operate: (1)
During much ofthe period considered inthis study, nominal
interest rates were a primary Federal Reserve control vari-
able. Thus, they can be at least partiallytreated as a policy
variable,especiallypriortothe 19.70S, before moneysupply
targeting became more explicit. (2) To the extentthat the
Fed did not attempt to control nominal interest rates on an
ann~al average basis (as used in this article), there will be
someendogeneityin the interestrate and apotential bias in
the estimatedcoefficients. However, based on pastmoney
demand and velocity studies, this biasisaptto be small.
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14. A casecan bernadetouseboth a short-and aJong-tefr;n
interestrate. Theshort-rate is considered mostappropriate
for the LM curve, and the long-rate for the IS curve. The
short rate is used in estimating these equations for two
reasons. From a theoretical point of view, the analysis
suggests that most of thevariance in velocity comes from
changes in demandformoney, ratherthan fr()m changes in
demandforgoods. From a statistical pointofview, itismore
reasonable to assume that the central bank controls short-
term ratherthan long-term interest and thus is statistically
more exogenous. (See previous footnote for further dis-
cussion ofthis issue.)
15. Many combinations and permutations ofthis equation
were estimated to test for structural stability. For example,
the equation was estimated with and without the 1941-51
period, with and without dummy variables. It was also esti-
mated for shorter time periods, such as 1952-83. None of
these changes resulted in significant changes in the coeffi-
cient values.
16. The·estimated error in the table is only one-half the
standard error of the equation. However, the size of the
stCindard error in the equation is dominated bythe 1922-40
period, whenvelocitychanges were much largerthan in the
post-warperiod. The error for 1982-83 is about in line with
the average error for 1952-83.
1.7. Technically, this is a money demand equation rear-
rangedto put GNP rather than M1 on the left-hand side. It
doeS, however, helptopointoutan importantperspectiveof
this article. While there are times when velocity changes
can 'ead to large unexpected changes in GNPnotassocia-
ted with money growth, those episodes will tend to be
relatively infrequent.
18. There is a problem with this equation because either
M1 ornominal interestrates can be treated as an exogenous
policy variable, but not both simultaneously. One way to
overcome this problem is to estimate the equation with
changes in inflation ratherthan changes in interest rates as
an independent variable. This deals with the statistical
problem becausethe effects of moneyon inflation typically
occurwith a long lag, that is, changes in inflation constitute
a predetermined variable. The results of estimating an
equation in this form isgiven below.





The results are SUbstantiallythe same as inthe interestrate
version•• M1 has a roughly proportional effecton GNP, except
in thosecircumstanceswhen there is Ci majorchargeinthe
inflation rate. Inflation'seffecton GNPis in linewith itseffect
on velocity.